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Executive summary 
 
This document is a report to the Brotherhood of St Laurence. We have been 
commissioned to critique the Victorian retail electricity market in its provision of 
electricity to households.   
 
Retailers consider that the Victorian electricity market is fiercely competitive. The 
Australian Energy Markets Commission (AEMC) agrees with this and says that 
competition is effective. The Australian Energy Regulator does not comment on the 
market. The Essential Services Commission of Victoria (ESC) has expressed concerns 
about retail costs and margins and is seeking to encourage debate about this. 
 
Energy consumer advocates are highly critical of the Victorian retail market. Consumer 
surveys commissioned by the ESC and AEMC are also not encouraging. The ESC’s 
survey finds consumer dissatisfaction with many aspects of the retail market. The 
AEMC’s survey finds Victorian consumers are less satisfied that those elsewhere in the 
National Electricity Market (NEM). 
 
Our quantitative analysis focuses on retail charges, starting with data on household 
electricity charges and prices supplied by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. We find 
that retailer charges (in respect of the costs that retailers control) have increased since 
the market was fully deregulated. Our calculation of retailer charges is broadly 
consistent with (if not towards the lower end) of the range estimated by others.  We 
also find that the fixed charges in retail tariffs are, relative to the fixed network charges, 
far higher in Victoria than elsewhere in the NEM.  This means that the average prices 
paid by low consumption (typically low income) households in Victoria are far higher 
than for higher consumption (typically higher income) households.  
 
The evidence on the effectiveness of competition seems to be contradictory. Retailers 
say the market is highly competitive and it is true that switching rates in Victoria are 
high by Australian and international standards. Also there do not seem to be significant 
barriers to retailer entry or customer switching.  
 
Why then are retail charges, on average, so high and why is there apparently so little 
evidence of product and service innovation? New entrant retailers have been able to 
build market share, but have typically been acquired by one of the major retailers once 
they have reached critical mass. The characterisation of the retail market, by the Chief 
Executive of a retailer that was acquired by one of the major incumbent generators, as 
an oligopoly selling a commodity product seems to be a reasonable characterisation of 
the current state of a market that has been open to competition for 13 years. If this 
characterisation is correct, then households seem to be paying retailers a lot but only 
getting a little in return. If there is indeed fierce competition, consumers don’t seem to 
be the beneficiaries of it.  
  
Markets are complex. More needs to be done to properly understand what is really 
going on. In addition to strategic analysis, quantitative work to understand retailer 
margins and return on investment, and cost structures would be very valuable. 
Consistent definitions and approaches will allow international and national 
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 3 
comparison. In this regard the quantitative analysis of retail markets being undertaken 
by the Competition and Markets Authority in Great Britain might form part of an 
analytical template.  
 
We also suggest analysis of possible interventions including the regulation of fixed 
charges. Is it possible to find interventions that improve the market for all consumers 
and not just for some at the expense of others?   
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1 Introduction 
 
This document is a report to the Brotherhood of St Laurence. The Brotherhood of St 
Laurence is a non-government, community-based organisation concerned with social 
justice.  
 
We have been commissioned to critique the Victorian retail electricity market 
specifically as it relates to the provision of electricity to households.  This report does 
not focus specifically on any particular segment of the residential electricity market. 
However the concerns raised in this report – apparently unhappy consumers, high 
retail costs and very high fixed elements of retail tariffs - affect the lower income 
households and individuals whose interests the Brotherhood of St Laurence promotes, 
most adversely. This means that low-income households and individuals have a 
particular interest in the issues that are the focus of this report.  
 
There are two main sections to this report. The first section summarises others’ views of 
the Victorian retail market. It then analyses those views and provides our own 
quantitative and strategic assessment.  The second section describes possible actions 
that regulators and the Government might consider.  
 
It is intended that this report is a constructive contribution to the contemporary debate 
about the Victorian retail market, in the context of widespread concern about the 
market.   
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2 Evidence and views 
 
This section summarises what regulators, consumer advocates and the industry have 
said about the retail electricity market in Victoria. We then present our own analysis 
and finally conclude.  
2.1  Background to the Victorian retail electricity market 
 
The Victorian retail electricity market is a market of around 2.3 million connections 
about 98% of whom are classified as small consumers – typically households and small 
businesses. 
 
Victoria is one of five states served by the National Electricity Market (NEM). This 
involves a mandatory market for the provision of electricity by large scale generators. A 
single transmission network service provider and then five distribution network service 
providers convey the electricity from these large scale generators to end users. Many 
end users also produce electricity through distributed generation to meet part of their 
own needs and at times export production surpluses to the grid. 
 
The retailing of electricity – which is the businesses of selling electricity to end users – is 
contestable and has been since 2002. From 2002 to 2008 the Essential Services 
Commission of Victoria (ESC) set the terms of some tariffs (known as reference tariffs 
or standing tariffs) which were intended to be fall-back tariffs for consumers who chose 
not accept tariffs offered in the market (known as market offers). Since 2009 the ESC 
does not regulate any retail tariffs. However some retailers are obliged to still offer 
reference/standing tariffs but they are free to set the terms of these tariffs.  
 
Retail tariffs in the other four states covered by the NEM are becoming deregulated, 
embarking on the path that the Victorian retail electricity market has been on since 
2009.  
2.2  Regulators 
 
Three regulatory commissions are involved in oversight of the Victorian electricity 
retail market in various ways. 
 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 
 
The ACCC enforces compliance with Australian Consumer Law which covers activities 
such as door to door sales and deceptive conduct. The ACCC has not commented on 
the competitiveness of the Victorian retail market but has issued fines to various 
retailers operating in Victoria for false, misleading and deceptive conduct. 
 
Essential Services Commission of Victoria (ESC) 
 
The ESC is responsible for regulating energy retailing in Victoria. All energy retailers 
are required to hold a licence granted by the Commission.  Energy licences place a 
range of obligations on energy companies, including compliance with the Energy Retail 
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Code (ERC).  The Commission has recently harmonised the ERC with the National 
Energy Consumer Framework (NECF) administered by the Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER), to enable national energy retailers to achieve regulatory efficiencies, 
whilst retaining a number of consumer protections that are unique to Victoria. 
However, these protections do not extend to the regulation of energy prices.  
 
Since 2009 the ESC has not regulated retail tariffs in Victoria.  The ESC may regulate 
retail tariffs but only if a review by the Australian Energy Markets Commission 
(AEMC) finds retail competition to be ineffective and recommends that price controls 
be reintroduced. The ESC has produced studies of the Victorian electricity retail market 
in 2002, 2004 and 2013.  
 
The ESC’s first (2002) study was completed shortly after the retail market was opened 
to competition. It noted that little could be said about the competitiveness of that 
market at such an early stage. However, it said that its price caps discouraged 
participation by suppressing margins and creating uncertainty about future levels of 
those caps. The net churn rate at the time of the review was 4%, and although there was 
evidence of innovation, the ESC expressed concern about the complexity of retailers’ 
offers and the ability to compare market offers across retailers.    
 
The ESC’s 2004 study pointed to seven new retailer entrants in the previous two years 
that had attracted 50,000 customers, that 13% of customers had switched retailer and 
that 17% of customers had chosen market rather than regulated contracts. It concluded 
that the market had been less than fully effective for the smaller retail customers.  
 
The ESC’s 2013 review included a research paper and a quantitative paper on retailer 
margins. The research paper suggested that Victorian retail electricity market could no 
longer be classified as highly concentrated (the market share of new entrants in 2012 
was close to 30%). It calculated customer churn rates in 2011 and 2012 of 17% (about 
40% below those reported by the AER, AEMC and the Energy Retailers Association 
which include new dwellings and customers moving between dwellings as churn).  
 
The quantitative paper commented on the findings of the ESC’s consultant’s reports on 
electricity prices and retailer margins in Victoria from 2006 to 2012. The consultant’s 
report focused on gross margins (i.e. the retail charge as a percentage of non-retail 
charges) and net margin. This was calculated for various tariffs and in each of five areas 
defined by the boundaries of the distribution network service providers. The report 
found that gross and net retail margin had been increasing since regulated reference 
tariffs had been withdrawn. It also found higher margins for customers that were still 
supplied on reference tariffs. It speculated that such customers were more “sticky” and 
that this might reflect complacency or a more fundamental inability to interact with a 
competitive market. 
 
The ESC suggested that its reports were not intended to definitively answer questions 
about the progress of retail competition, but rather to shed light on the reason for price 
rises in Victoria which would inform discussions about the effectiveness and extent of 
competition in the Victorian retail electricity market.  
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In 2013 the ESC commissioned market research to understand aspects of the Victorian 
retail market1. This report found that Victorians rate the electricity offers they are 
presented with very poorly, and generally lower than they have in the past. It found 
that older people and lower income households are less likely to switch retailer than 
younger people and higher income households.  It found that price was by far the 
biggest reason for switching retailer and that those who remain on standing offers do 
so because they see no benefit in changing.  
 
Australian Energy and Markets Commission 
 
The AEMC reviewed the Victorian retail market in 2008, as a precursor to the 
withdrawal of regulated reference prices. It concluded that the Victorian retail 
electricity market was workably competitive. It concluded in particular that there were 
low barriers to entry, that Victoria had one of the highest switching rates in the world 
and that although half of all residential customers had by then not switched off 
regulated tariffs it could not be assumed that such non-switchers were not getting the 
benefits from competition.  
 
The AEMC periodically produces information relevant to the assessment of retail costs, 
as part of its annual small consumer price reports. Its 2011 report2 said that retailers’ 
charges per kWh sold to households in 2013/14 in Victoria (based on regulated 
reference tariffs) were expected to be between 2.2 and 3.4 times higher than those in 
New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia.  
 
Its 2013 report3 did not express retail charges in the same way but instead stated the 
retail charges per kWh, giving a wide range in each state: 0 to 3 cents/kWh in South 
Australia, between 1.7 and 2.6 cents/kWh in Queensland and New South Wales. Again 
Victoria led the pack by a wide margin (between 3.3 and 7.6 cents per kWh).    
 
In August 2014 the AEMC completed its first annual retail competition review in the 
National Electricity Market4. It concluded that “a range of competitive market indicators 
suggest the Victorian market has the right conditions in place to promote rivalry between 
retailers and we have not found a systemic issue on the retailer-side of the market that suggests 
competition is not working”. In relation to its finding from previous work that retail 
margins in Victoria were higher than elsewhere in the National Electricity Market, the 
AEMC suggested that “Competition is a process and retailer margins can be expected to 
fluctuate over time. Estimates of retailer margins should therefore be interpreted with caution.”  
 
  
                                                      
 
1 “Victorian’s experience of the electricity market”, 2013. Wallis Consulting Group. Available 
from www.esc.vic.gov.au. 
2  AEMC , 2011. “Possible Future Retail Electricity Price Movements: 1 July 2011 to 30 June 214, 
Final Report.” Available from www.aemc.gov.au. 
3 AEMC 2013. “2013 Residential Electricity Price Trends”. Available from www.aemc.gov.au. 
4 AEMC, 2014. “2014 Retail Competition Review”. Available from 
http://www.aemc.gov.au/Markets-Reviews-Advice/2014-Retail-Competition-Review 
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Australian Energy Regulator (AER) 
 
The AER administers the National Energy Consumer Framework (NECF) but has no 
role in regulating the retailing of energy in Victoria.  It is Victorian Government policy 
not to transfer retail regulation to the NECF. The AER nonetheless includes information 
on the Victorian market in its Annual Reports.  In its 2014 annual report the AER 
provides data on retailer market shares and customer switching data. In its latest report 
(and in all previous reports) it made no adverse (or complimentary) comment on the 
competitiveness of the Victorian electricity retail market or whether the outcomes it is 
delivering are acceptable.   
2.3  Consumer advocates 
 
St Vincent de Paul 
 
The Society of St Vincent de Paul produce very useful bi-annual reports on retail 
electricity prices in Victoria, analysing both reference and market tariffs. An enduring 
theme of their reports is that some retailers offer significantly lower prices than others.  
 
Their July 2014 report5 produces an interesting analysis of retail costs based on market 
offers to customers connected to Jemena’s distribution network. From this they estimate 
retail charges of $380 per household, which is 25% more than their estimate of the 
wholesale charge. They comment “if the retail component of households’ energy bills in a 
competitive market is greater than the cost of wholesale energy it must be time to examine where 
the market design went wrong”.     
 
Consumer Utilities Advocacy Centre (CUAC) 
 
CUAC undertook a study of the Victorian electricity retail market cover the period 2009 
to 2012. The examined market concentration using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
(HHI) and the Four Firm Concentration Ratio (CR4) and noted that in the three years 
since market deregulation there was no evidence of a significant reduction in market 
concentration or evidence of strong new entrant retailers. They concluded that the three 
first tier retailers offered similar prices to each other (this is also seems to be generally 
consistent with St Vincent de Paul’s reports). They also suggested that in January and 
July 2012, new entrant retailers increased their prices as much as the first tier retailers. 
From this they speculated that marketing expenditure rather than price innovation and 
price differentiation is a significant factor affecting market share.  
  
                                                      
 
5 St Vincent de Paul, 2014. “Victorian energy prices July 2014: An update report on the Victorian 
tariff tracking project”. Available from 
https://www.vinnies.org.au/page/Our_Impact/Incomes_Support_Cost_of_Living/Energy/VI
C/ 
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2.4  The industry 
 
Energy Retailers Association of Australia (ERAA) 
 
The ERAA contends6 that the Victorian electricity market is a fiercely competitive 
market. It says that since price caps were removed in Victoria on 1 January 2009 
competition has developed strongly, offering customers more diverse and innovative 
energy products, and enabling consumers to save on their power bills by shopping 
around. Since this date there has been a growth in the number of smaller retailers. The 
Victorian market is the least concentrated in the country with the three incumbent 
retailers having about 70-75 per cent of the market while a range of new entrant 
retailers have secured about 25-30 per cent of overall customers. They draw attention to 
a 2012 study by consultancy vasaaETT7 that concluded that the Victorian electricity 
market had the highest rate of switching in the world.8  The ERAA also strongly 
rejected the ESC’s 2013 findings on retail margins in Victoria.  
 
Retailers  
 
The retailers that operate in the Victorian electricity market seldom comment on the 
market, although when they do – in their annual reports or investor presentations -  
they usually describe it as one characterised by vigorous or intense competition. 
Interestingly, both Origin Energy and AGL Energy, two of the largest retailers both 
consistently report much lower switching rates for their customer base than for the 
market as a whole. 
  
                                                      
 
6 See for example ERAA letter to Mr Neil Howes, Australian Energy Market Commission, 5 July 
2013. Available from www.aemc.gov.au 
7VaasaETT, 2006. “World Retail Market Rankings”. Available from www.eraa.com.au 
8 It is not clear that their comparison accounts for all the difference. For example the Victorian 
switching rates include retailer contracts with new dwellings, and when an existing consumer 
relocates is counted as a switch. In Victoria small non-residential customers are also included. In 
Britain for example switch rates do not include non-residential customers, and the ESC’s 
analysis is that 2012 switch rates excluding new dwellings and relocations were about 40% 
below the rate claimed by vasaaETT. 
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2.5  Our  analysis 
 
This subsection sets out our analysis of retail charges in Victoria. Figure 1 below, 
compares the network and non-network charges in Victoria to those in other states in 
the NEM. The analysis is based on standing offers/regulated reference tariffs and 
published network tariffs in the year ending 30 June 2014. Market offers are typically 
lower than standing tariffs. However we have crossed checked these prices with the 
prices obtained from the ABS’s authoritative 2012 survey9 (discussed in further detail in 
this section) and indexed to 2014 using the ABS’s indices and from this we conclude 
that the information contained in Figure 1 can be relied upon as a reasonable indication 
of network and non-network charges to average usage households in various parts of 
the NEM10. The figure shows a remarkable difference between average retail charges to 
households in Victoria compared to those charges in other states.  
 
Figure 1. Breakdown of average price for average consumption household 
 
 
 
                                                      
 
9 ABS 2013. “Australian household energy survey”. Available from www.abs.gov.au 
10 We refer those readers wishing to explore this in further detail to Mountain, B. 2015. “Network 
tariffs applicable to households in Australia: empirical evidence”. A report for UnitingCare Australia. 
Available from www.cmeaustralia.com.au. It should also be noted that there are various details 
that need to be taken into account in a more precise understanding of the relative size of the red 
and green bars. For example the green bar for Victoria, includes the smart meter costs, which 
account for about 1.5 cents per kWh in that year. And in South Australia and Queensland in 
particular solar feed-in tariffs mean  that the red bars in those states should be reduced by about 
1.5 cents per kWh to ensure comparison with those in other states.  
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In the rest of this sub-section we estimate the retail charges to households in Victoria 
and then comment on market concentration, barriers to entry, barriers to switching, 
product innovation and consumers’ views.  
 
Retail charges  
 
Our analysis examines the charges that retailers present to households for the sale of 
electricity. This amount is not presented on electricity bills separately from other 
charges and so needs to be estimated. Our analysis starts with data provided by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) of household electricity bills in 2012 and 
household electricity price indices before and after that. From this we deduct network 
charges (which can be reasonably accurately calculated based on known network 
tariffs), various non-network charges (covering environmental and metering charges) 
and then wholesale supply charges (which we estimate within a range). The residual 
from this calculation is the charge by retailers for the services they provide. The text 
that follows explains our calculations in detail. 
 
Figure 2 below shows the change in the average annual household electricity bill in 
Victoria from 2008 to 2014 (the blue line). This is based on the Bureau’s 2013 report11 of 
average household electricity bills in Victoria in 2012. The values for the other years in 
this chart are calculated by adjusting the 2012 value for the change in the ABS’s 
Melbourne household electricity price.  
 
Figure 2. Total charge, network charge and derived non-network charge 
 
 
 
The red line in the chart is the average household network services charge which we 
have calculated based on the known network tariffs for each of the five distribution 
network service providers (and using the average consumption used in the ABS study). 
To obtain a Victoria-wide average we have weighted the number of connections of each 
network service providers as a proportion of the Victorian total.  
                                                      
 
11 ABS 2013. “Australian household energy survey”. Available from www.abs.gov.au 
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The difference between the blue line and the red line is the green line. This is the 
derived non-network charge. This non-network charge represents the charges for 
wholesale energy plus retailing plus a variety of environmental and metering charges 
which retailers incur and pass on to households.  
 
We now proceed to strip out what we call “other exogenous charges” from the derived 
non-network charge. These ”other exogenous charges” include payments for metering, 
environmental charges (feed-in tariffs, the Victorian Energy Efficient Target and the 
federal Renewable Energy Target). To do this we have used the analysis of other 
exogenous charges presented in Oakley Greenwood 201512,13.  The result of this analysis 
gives the derived wholesale plus retail charge in Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3. Derived non-network, other exogenous charges and derived wholesale + retail 
charge 
 
 
We recognise nonetheless that the black line in Figure 3 may be slightly understated 
and so the resulting implied wholesale + retail charge (the orange line) may be slightly 
overstated, but the difference will not be large.  We therefore suggest that the orange 
line is a reasonable estimate of the wholesale electricity plus retailer charges for the 
average Victorian household. The orange line shows that the inferred wholesale plus 
retail charge has roughly doubled between 2008 and 2014.  
 
The next step in our analysis is to separate the wholesale electricity charge from the 
retail charge. This is impossible to do with certainty since the wholesale charge for 
different retailers is not known with certainty:  many retailers produce much of the 
electricity they sell and their cost of production is not known with certainty. In addition 
while they can buy directly from the spot market or enter into physical or financial 
                                                      
 
12 Oakley Greenwood 2015. “Causes of residential electricity bill changes in Victoria, 1995 to 
2014: A report for the Victorian electricity distribution businesses.” 
13 The Oakely Greenwood analysis is based on a 4,0 kWh per year customer (whereas the ABS 
data has an average annual household consumption of 5,6 kWh). We have however not adjusted 
for this difference in annual consumption since the largest proportion of these exogenous 
charges (metering charges) are recovered per connection not per MWh consumed. 
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contracts the terms of these contracts (and the proportion they buy from the spot 
market) is not known with certainty.  
 
We therefore need to estimate wholesale electricity charges in order to derive an 
estimate of the derived retail charge. Before doing this, to get a sense of how the 
wholesale plus retail charge has varied in comparison to a wholesale market reference 
price (the demand weighted spot price for the Victorian region of the National 
Electricity Market), we have expressed both of these as an index starting at 1 in 2008.  
 
This is shown in Figure 4. This shows that the increase in the wholesale plus retail 
charge does not seem to be explained by changes in the wholesale price which is much 
the same in 2014 as it was in 2008 and varied in a range of plus or minus 30% between 
these dates. 
Figure 4. Index of wholesale prices and of derived wholesale plus retail charges 
 
 
To estimate the retail charge (the charge by retailers for the retail service they provide) 
we have estimate a wholesale charge within a range of plus or minus 20% of the 
reference price (the spot price) and deducted the resulting wholesale charge (assuming 
5,585 kWh average annual consumption – based on the ABS’2 2012 survey) to give an 
annual retail charge in dollars per household.  This is shown in Figure 5 below.  
Figure 5. Derived retail charges – upper and lower bounds 
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From Figure 5 we see that retail charges between 2008 and 2014 increased by about 2.4 
times, and by 2014 lie in the band between $371 and $471 per household per year. 
Throughout this period households in Victoria were able to choose who supplied 
electricity to them, and from 2009 to 2014 there was no control over retail prices.  
 
We have benchmarked our estimate for the retail charge with the estimates that others 
have made: 
 
• As discussed St Vincent de Paul estimated the retail charge for customers 
connected to Jemena’s network in 2014 at $381. This is within the range of our 
estimates. 
• The AEMC estimated the retail charge in Victoria in 2011 (based on standing 
offers) at 34.4% of the total bill. This is slightly above our upper bound for 2011. 
• The ESC’s consultants produced various estimates of “gross margins” (which is 
definitionally comparable to our estimate of retail charge) for first tier suppliers 
based on standing offer and market offers. For 2012 these ranged between 26.5% 
and 46%. The bottom end of their range is a little above the bottom of our range 
and the top end of their range is above the top of our range.  
 
Market concentration 
 
From the time the market was liberalised in 2002, new entrant retailers have grown to 
supply about 25% of the Victorian electricity market. However since 2008 (the last year 
during which regulated tariffs were available) and 2014, the market share of the three 
dominant first tier retailers has remained roughly unchanged.  
 
Since 2002 there have been a number of new entrant retailers. However once they reach 
a certain size they have been acquired by one of the three first tier retailers (and in one 
case by a government-owned generator already with a significant retail business in 
Victoria, albeit that some of these acquisitions have arisen as a result of privatisations in 
Queensland (Powerdirect) and New South Wales (Country Energy and Energy 
Australia). Specifically: 
 
• The acquisition of Powerdirect by AGL Energy in 2007; 
• The acquisition of Country Energy and Energy Australia by Origin Energy and 
TRUenergy respectively in 2010; 
• The acquisition of Australian Power Group by AGL Energy in 2013; 
• The acquisition of Lumo by Snowy Hydro in 2014.  
 
With the exception of Lumo’s acquisition by Snowy Hydro, the pattern has therefore 
been a decline in the market share of the first tier retailers who have then bought 
customers back by acquiring second tier retailers. Snowy Hydro with its organically 
built Red Energy and acquired Lumo energy retail businesses stands as the one 
exception of a non-first tier retailer to have built a significant (circa 20%) share of the 
Victorian household electricity retail market.  
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Barriers to entry 
 
It is not clear to us that there are meaningful barriers to entry in the Victorian electricity 
retail market. The ESC’s licensing requirements do not seem to place undue burdens on 
retailers. Likewise in the context of significant uncontracted generation we suspect it is 
unlikely that new entrant retailers would find the management of wholesale market 
price risk to be unduly onerous.  
 
Barriers to switching 
 
It is not obvious that there are significant barriers to switching. Around three quarters 
of the residential market is now supplied on market contracts. While the switching 
numbers quoted by the ERAA and AER may be significantly higher than the actual 
switching rates (according to the ESC 17% in 2012, against the AER and ERAA’s claim 
of 28% for that year), a switching rate of 17% is still a significant rate of customer churn. 
It is interesting to note in this regard that AGL Energy expects that by the end of the 
first full year after the acquisition of APG it will have lost around 35% of the APG 
customers it had acquired, and AGL noted that this is consistent with its business case 
for the acquisition of APG14.  
 
It might be argued that search costs are low – there are numerous government-
provided and commercially-provided price comparison and switching websites. 
Finding a better deal should not take too much effort. However St Vincent de Paul’s 
analysis shows that most retailers’ offers are clustered together.  Consumers may be 
able to get much better deals by, for example, changing from one type of tariff to 
another, but this often requires a sophisticated knowledge of tariffs and data on annual 
consumption and expected consumption at different times of the day. Such data is 
almost impossible for the typical residential consumer to obtain.   
 
Furthermore even if much better deals can be had in the market from time to time, it  
seems that such savings don’t seem to persist. As evidence of this we point to the high 
switching rates and AGL Energy’s expectation that it will lose more than a third of the 
customers it acquired through the acquisition of APG, after the first year.  
 
Product innovation 
 
On product innovation it seems difficult to see that there has been much progress. In its 
critique of the ESC’s consultant’s retail margins report, the Retailer Association’s 
consultant suggested a number of reasons why the ESC’s consultant had over-stated 
margins15. This included magazine subscriptions, airline and credit card loyalty 
program points, monthly cash prize draws and gift cards. At the time of writing this 
report we checked the offers of Victoria’s three largest electricity retailers. One of them 
                                                      
 
14 See AGL ASX Media Release 11 February 2015. Available from www.agl.com.au  
15 See Deloitte, 2013. “Retailer margins in Victorian Electricity Market: A report to the Energy 
Retailers Association of Australia”. Included as an attachment to ERAA letter to Mr Neil Howes, 
Australian Energy Market Commission, 5 July 2013. Available from www.aemc.gov.au 
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offered “flybuys” loyalty points at the rate of 1 per dollar spent – which is about 1400 
points per household per year. To get a sense of the value of this, the “flybuys” 
website’s featured offer was $20 worth of clothes for 2000 points. On this calculation, 
almost two years of electricity purchases would be rewarded with a $20 clothing 
voucher.  
 
Other new entrant retailers do offer air miles and one offers a gift card to new 
customers. But it is hard to imagine that this might be taken as evidence of product 
innovation, or as evidence that retailers’ margins (as we and others have estimated 
them) are overstated. The Wallis survey cited earlier suggests consumers think such 
rewards are inconsequential in their switching decisions. 
 
Other “innovations” include discounts for online accounts, dual fuel, direct debt or 
prompt payment and so on. The Wallis survey suggests consumers place a little value 
on these in their switching decisions. Some retailers offer free power on saturdays or 
the electricity retail equivalent of “happy hours”. Most offer sign-on bonuses, typically 
credited to the account and some offer finder fees (again credited to the account). This 
might be good evidence of marketing to attract and retain customers and management  
by retailers of their of credit risks, but surely not of product innovation. 
 
One new entrant retailer with a tiny share of the market is known to offer highly 
innovative retail products that offer consumers the opportunity to buy ahead and 
monitor their hourly, daily, monthly and annual consumption through online and 
mobile applications.  This same retailer has entered the retail market in New South 
Wales – which according to the AEMC as noted earlier has much lower retail margins 
than Victoria. 
 
Thirteen years after the Victorian retail market was opened to competition and several 
years after smart meters were rolled-out, the vast majority of retail sales are still on 
simple two part tariffs with no time of use differentiation. No retailers offer tariffs 
without fixed daily charges, and none offer tariffs with demand charges. Perhaps 
retailers have assessed that consumers don’t value this, perhaps it is because they find 
easier ways to attract and retain customers. It is telling that the recently departed Chief 
Executive of the most successful new entrant retailer in Victoria (Australian Power and 
Gas) described the Victorian electricity market in 2014 as an oligopoly offering a 
“commodity” product16.  
 
Consumer views 
 
National surveys consistently rate concerns about electricity prices at or near the top of 
the list of household concerns.17 A recent survey18 undertaken for the AEMC found that 
                                                      
 
16 See http://www.crikey.com.au/2013/07/16/power-sale-how-they-doorknocked-customers-
then-sold-them-back/ 
17 See for example http://consumersfederation.org.au/choice-consumer-survey-reveals-
growing-economic-gloom/.  
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retailers in Victoria scored worse than the average in the National Electricity Market in 
respect of household consumers’ satisfaction with their current electricity company, 
their quality of service, their value for money and market choice.  
2.6  Conclusions 
 
This section has surveyed others’ views of the Victorian electricity market and then 
presented our own, brief, analysis. On others’ views: 
 
• The ESC is concerned about retailer margins. By contrast neither the AEMC nor 
the AER have expressed any concern about the competitiveness of the Victorian 
retail electricity market or retailer charges and margins.  
 
• The association representing energy retailers disputed the Essential Services 
Commission’s concern about retail margins. In their statements to investors, the 
two largest stock exchange listed Victorian retailers typically describe the 
Victorian retail market as highly or intensely competitive. Other retailers are 
less effusive, describing the industry as an oligopoly. 
 
• The Victorian Government has expressed concern about the size of fixed 
charges19 but also that the Victorian electricity market is one of the most 
competitive in the world20, although officials21 and politicians22 have expressed 
concern about retailer margins. 
 
• Consumer groups representing low income consumers are concerned about 
market concentration and excessive retail charges.  
 
From the evidence we have surveyed in developing this report we conclude that there 
do not seem to be significant barriers to entry to new entrant retailers, that the 
transaction costs that customers incur do not seem to be a barrier to switching retailer, 
and that the effort and costs that customers incur to find better deals (if not the best 
deals) do not seem significant.  However, the effort required to find the best deal, not 
just a better deal - the St Vincent de Paul’s reports show consistently that there is a big 
gap between the best and the median - may be significant. Furthermore, the evidence 
seems to be that the best deal does not stay the best for long – not because other better 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
18 See Newgate, 2014. “Consumer Research for Nationwide Review of Competition in Retail 
Energy Markets”. Available from http://www.aemc.gov.au/Markets-Reviews-Advice/2014-
Retail-Competition-Review 
19 See for example http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-07/gas-electricity-fixed-costs-up-
50pc-in-victoria/6077396 
20 See for example http://www.energyandresources.vic.gov.au/energy/electricity 
21 See for example http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/latest/victoria-looks-to-act-on-
electricity-margins/story-e6frg90f-1227080728468 
22 See for example http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/soaring-power-costs-leads-to-record-
number-of-disconnections-in-victoria-20150218-13i4lt.html 
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deals are available in the market – but because having attracted customers through 
discounts, retailers do not seem to wait long to raise their prices.  
 
This is where the ambiguous or at best positive picture ends. There seems to be a 
considerable amount of highly adverse evidence: 
 
• The Ombudsman reports electricity retail complaints reached their highest ever 
levels in 201423, 50% higher than four years earlier. Billing problems accounted 
for half of all complaints.   
 
• Electricity disconnections in Victoria in 2014 – at around 1% of all connections - 
is at an all-time high. 
 
• While there are some new entrant retailers offering genuinely innovative 
products they serve a tiny proportion of Victoria’s electricity consumers, and 
have anyway entered other retail markets in Australia where retail charges are 
much lower than in Victoria. Despite an expensive mandatory roll-out of smart 
meters, most consumers are still supplied on the same time-invariant two part 
tariffs structures that have been in place for many decades. 
 
• The survey evidence on consumers’ views about retailers is not encouraging. 
Households in Victoria are less satisfied with their current electricity company, 
their quality of service, their value for money and market choice than the 
average of households in the National Electricity Market. This is despite 
systematically higher switching rates in Victoria than elsewhere in NEM, and 
that the smallest proportion of Victorian electricity consumers are supplied on 
reference tariffs: evidently switching retailer is not bringing Victoria’s 
household consumers the satisfaction they are seeking.  
 
• The unsatisfactory consumer assessment is matched by even less satisfactory 
retail charges. Our assessment is that retail charges have more than doubled 
since regulated reference tariffs were in place in 2008, and are now far higher 
than elsewhere in the NEM and than the cost of producing electricity. The 
suggestion that a significant part of the higher retail charge is paid back to 
consumers in gift cards, fly-buys and other loyalty credits does not seem 
plausible.  
 
• Finally, the pattern of new entrant retailers gaining scale and then being 
acquired by one of the three dominant retailers means that the three dominant 
retailers have retained their market share since prices controls were lifted in 
2009. This roundabout will have delivered gains to investors in the new entrant 
retailers, and presumably the retailers that acquired them are satisfied (or they 
would not have chosen to buy). Some of the customers who switched between 
retailers at different points will have obtained better prices than market 
averages. But to what end is such a roundabout with all its attendant costs? 
                                                      
 
23 See EWOV Annual Report, 2014. Available from www.ewov.vic.gov.au 
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A conclusion from this is that the Victorian electricity retail market does not seem to be 
delivering to consumers what they want, and that it seems to be offering poor value for 
money relative to what it has in the past and relative to retailing elsewhere in the 
National Electricity Market. The Victorian market has had time to evolve: households 
have been able to choose their suppliers for 13 years, and six years ago all price controls 
were lifted. Would decision-makers have set the market on its current course if they 
were able to predict where things seem to have got to now?  
 
However, we stress that our report does not purport to be a comprehensive 
examination: our conclusions should be considered tentative. Markets are complex and 
finding out what is really going on takes careful study and reflection. It would be 
valuable to understand the position not just of consumers on average relative to 
retailers on average, but cohorts of consumers relative to each other and cohorts of 
retailers relative to each other. Have some consumers fared much better than others, 
and if so why? Have consumers failed to take advantage of opportunities or have 
retailers benefitted from those that are unwilling or unable to take advantage of 
opportunities?   
 
Littlechild (2015) asks whether evidence that consumers can get a lower price by 
shopping should be taken as evidence that the market is working, or is evidence that 
they pay a higher price if they don’t shop around, evidence that the market isn't? This 
seems to be a key question in the Victorian electricity market. Can consumers indeed 
get an (enduringly) better deal by shopping around? Do the apparently better deals that 
they select turn out to be worse deals in due course? And so are consumers, once bitten 
twice shy? Do survey’s such as the Wallace survey that suggest many consumers “can’t 
be bothered” to shop around, indicative of their willingness to pay higher prices or are 
there other explanations for this? Finally, since electricity is essential for most 
households, and there are limited or no substitutes in many cases, should consumers be 
entitled to some level of regulatory protection even if they don’t actively engage in the 
market, or,  “the devil take the hindmost”? Can such protection be designed so as to 
improve outcomes for all consumers or is it inevitable that protection for some is at the 
others’ expense? 
 
Further examination may support or undermine our findings or offer plausible 
explanations for at least some of the adverse outcomes that we have observed. 
However, at this stage, on the basis of the evidence we have reported on in this paper, 
we cannot conclude other than that the Victorian retail electricity market seems to be 
delivering clearly unsatisfactory outcomes, at least in respect of sales to households. 
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3 Possible actions  
 
This section considers, briefly, a number of possible actions. The purpose is not to 
recommend any such actions but rather to describe some possibilities and identify 
issues that might be considered in each.  
 
Littlechild (2015)24 criticises Ofgem’s various interventions in the retail market in 
Britain over the last few years, suggesting that the cures have been worse than the 
disease, or to be more precise that there was no disease in need of a cure. In Australia 
by comparison, there has been no administrative intervention in the Victorian 
electricity market since 2009. And the Victorian arrangements have been promoted by 
the ERAA and AEMC as the model for the deregulation of other retail electricity 
markets in Australia.  
 
A decision to intervene must be justified on the basis that it will make things better. 
This requires judgment that there is a problem to be solved and that doing something 
about it will make matters better not worse. The previous section suggests that 
outcomes in Victoria’s household retail market are unsatisfactory, and that when there 
was previously some form of intervention (regulated standing offers) retail charges 
were much lower. It is hard to know whether consumers thought they were better off 
then, but it is clear that they have taken a long time to move from those regulated 
standing/reference tariffs: six years since administrative restraints on those tariffs have 
been relaxed and 13 years since consumers could choose market offers, one quarter of 
households are still supplied on those reference tariffs.  
 
We also pointed to evidence that Victoria’s households think they are worse off than 
the average households in the NEM, and that Victoria’s retail charges are much higher 
(at least twice as high as elsewhere) in the NEM and that they have increased since the 
regulation of standing offers was withdrawn. Faced with this evidence – presuming it 
withstands further scrutiny – the desire to make changes is understandable.  
 
In the rest of this section we examine three possibilities: 
 
• Transparency 
• Tariff simplification; 
• Reintroduction of regulated standing tariffs; 
• Regulation of fixed charges. 
 
However, before examining these we describe work to understand the situation in 
Victoria better. We think work on this is essential to understanding the current 
situation, and in justifying any major changes that might follow. 
 
 
                                                      
 
24 Littlechild, S. C. 2014. “Promoting or restricting competition?: Regulation of the UK retail 
residential energy market since 2008”. EPRG Working Paper 1415. Available from 
www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk. 
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3.1  Transparency 
 
Greater transparency is usually one of the first options that governments and regulators 
turn to in promoting markets. Considerable effort has been made on this in Victoria. 
The survey results on this are encouraging: 87% of respondents are quite or fairly 
interested in energy issues; 95% are aware of that they can choose their supplier; 79% 
are fairly or quite confident in their understanding of offers and options. The 
knowledge of comparison websites (41%) is less encouraging, but lack of information 
does not seem to be a major concern.  
 
Transparency is valuable also in assessing and understanding the market. We have 
found the ESC’s reports invaluable in making our assessments, and the customer 
survey commissioned by the AEMC in 2014 has also been very useful. The ESC’s retail 
margin studies drew a strongly critical response from the industry. But our assessment 
is that their response is longer on heat than it is on light and the information obtained 
through this process is extremely valuable.  
 
Further effort at understanding the operation of the market and its outcomes including 
those difficult to estimate – such as net margins – will be valuable.  Questions that have 
attracted our attention include: 
 
• Why there is apparently so little evidence of innovation? For example why is 
there so little up-take of time-variant tariffs and why do retailers not offer tariffs 
without fixed charges, surely this is a demand for such products in the market? 
• Why fixed charges in retail contracts in Victoria (see Section 3.3) are so much 
higher than elsewhere in Australia (and internationally)?  
• Whether the track record of new entrants as we have understood it – growth 
followed by acquisition by one of the incumbents - is a reasonable description of 
the pattern of new entry? If so what should be concluded from this about the 
competitiveness of the market? 
• Whether the apparent profitability meaningfully overstated after accounting for 
loyalty rewards ?  
• How profitable retailing electricity to households and small businesses in 
Victoria actually is? In this regard we note the long-standing work of Ofgem 
and the recent work by the Competition and Markets authority25 in analysing 
retailer profitability in Great Britain. It would be valuable to obtain estimates of  
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and  gross profit less indirect costs and 
depreciation and amortisation (D&A) from the retail sale of electricity to 
Victorian households and small businesses. International comparison would be 
helpful and ensuring a consistent approach in Victoria with the approach 
adopted in GB would help such international comparison. 
 
We suggest that work to develop a better understanding of these issues would be 
valuable before taking further action.   
                                                      
 
25 See CMA, 2015. “Energy market investigation. Profitability of retail energy supply: profit 
margin analysis”. Available from https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/energy-market-investigation 
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3.2  Tariff simplification 
 
The arguments for tariff simplification can be found in observations in behavioural 
economics that too much choice confuses and disempowers consumers. The implication 
is that consumers are less likely to participate in a market, and so the competitiveness 
of the market is diminished. 
 
It is not clear that there is a problem of too much choice in the Victorian electricity 
markets. The survey commissioned by the AEMC suggests that consumers think they 
are aware of their options and understand the market. And the switching data points to 
a liquid market even if, as we suggest, consumers are not always armed with the 
information and skills to work out the best deal on offer.  
 
We also refer again to the observation of the ex- CEO of Victoria’s most successful new 
entrant retailer, that the Victorian electricity market is a commodity market. If anything, 
we would have thought that the problem is not that the market seems to offer too many 
confusing choices, but that it offers too few sophisticated choices. 
 
There are other good arguments against intervention to reduce choice. Littlechild (2015) 
observes that consumers prefer simplicity but not if it means higher prices. Forcing 
consumers to pay higher prices on simpler tariffs in order to enhance market liquidity 
is a difficult argument to sustain. 
 
Mostly however, we seem to be at the start of a new era of distributed generation, 
storage and smart meters. We are more confident that competing retailers, rather than 
regulators, will be able to find retail products that offer value to consumers in this more 
complex and data intensive environment. Governments should be wary before 
intervening in ways that may stunt product innovation in the hope that apparent 
simplicity will deliver greater competition.  
 
3.3  Reintroduction of regulated standing tariffs 
 
Our analysis suggests that average retail charges were lower when regulated standing 
offers were available, up to the end of 2008. This is despite the fact that these standing 
offers included “headroom” designed to provide an incentive for new entrant retailers. 
It is tempting therefore to suggest that one possible solution would be to reintroduce 
regulated standing offers (just as they are being withdrawn in other regional markets in 
Australia). 
 
We think it would be worthwhile exploring this further. The market share of new 
entrants was higher and retail charges were lower when regulated offers were 
available. Its difficult to see that there was any less innovation then than now and there 
does not seem to be evidence that consumers are more satisfied then than now: indeed 
as noted earlier comparing Victoria with other retail markets, the Newgate survey 
suggests the opposite. 
 
On the other hand it may be suggested that reintroducing regulated tariffs is like trying 
to put the genie back into the bottle – an exercise in futility. And, with almost all 
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Victorian households and small businesses now having smart meters, many households 
now having distributed generation and probably some level of distributed storage in 
future, the job of defining appropriate regulated reference tariffs may be much harder 
than it was just five years ago.  
 
For these reasons, while the reintroduction of regulated retail tariffs merits further 
investigation we think it should be approached with care. 
3.4   Regulation of fixed charges 
 
The black (vertically shaded) bars in Figure 6 below shows the annual fixed charges ($ 
per year) that households were paying in 2014 on reference tariffs (regulated other than 
in Victoria). The red (horizonally shaded) bars are the fixed charges in the regulated 
network tariffs that are charged to retailers in respect of their supply to household. The 
chart shows clearly that retailers in Victoria are paying much lower fixed charges to 
network service providers26 than retailers elsewhere in the NEM are paying to the 
network service providers in their areas of supply.  
Figure 6. Network and retail fixed charges ($/year) for electricity supply to households in the 
National Electricity Market in the year to 31 December 2014 
 
 
For an average household electricity bill in Victoria of around $1,400 in 2014, around 
30-40% of the charge is fixed. The proportion is even higher in 2015. This is a higher 
                                                      
 
26 Citipower and Powercor have both increased fixed charges in 2015. 
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proportion than elsewhere in the NEM, and we believe far higher than for household 
electricity bills in other developed economies27.  
 
In addition, as St Vincent de Paul’s tariff reports show, market offers typically offer 
discounts against the variable charge only – the daily fixed charge is based on the 
charges in standing offers. This means that the proportion that is fixed is even higher 
than the estimates in Figure 6 which based on reference tariffs.  
 
The high fixed charges mean that lower consumption consumers (typically lower 
income households) pay much higher average prices than higher consumption 
households. For example, in AusNet’s area of supply, the fixed charge raises average 
annual prices by 4 cents per kWh for households that consume twice the average but by 
16 cents per kWh for households that consume half the average.  
 
We are not aware of any retailer in Victoria that offers a variable-only tariff (i.e. a tariff 
that does not have a fixed charge). One new entrant retailer that offers innovative retail 
products is, as far as we are aware, the only retailer to include the daily fixed charge in 
its calculation of discounted “powerpacks”.  
 
It might be that a part of the higher fixed charge in Victoria is related to the recovery of 
smart meter charges. These have become significant (between $109 and $226 per 
connection) in 201528, though the charges have been much smaller than this in previous 
years and retail fixed charges were still much higher than network fixed charges even 
when smart meter charges were much lower.  
 
If retail tariffs were regulated we would call on theoretical arguments that such fixed 
charges are inefficient: in regulated utilities as in markets, prices should be set so that 
they reflect marginal costs, not (sunk) fixed costs. If this leaves a revenue shortfall for 
some sellers, recovering the shortfall through fixed charges limits the ability of 
consumers to adjust their consumption in efficiency-enhancing ways. It would be more 
efficient to recover revenue shortfalls through volumetric or demand charges to which 
consumers are able to respond, if they choose to, by reducing or changing the pattern of 
their consumption. 
 
In addition, tariffs with high fixed charges are regressive (lower than average 
household electrical consumption is correlated with lower than average household 
income). High fixed charges diminish incentives to efficient consumption and 
undermine households’ ability to reduce their bills by consuming less or producing 
electricity themselves to meet their own requirements.    
 
                                                      
 
27 In large parts of the United States for example, household tariffs are purely volumetric and in 
some cases have small fixed charges typically to recover customer-specific fixed charges such as 
metering and billing.  
28 See AER 2014 “Determination Advanced Metering Infrastructure 2015 revised charges”, 
available from www.aer.gov.au. 
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It might be suggested that such theoretical efficiency and fairness considerations are 
irrelevant because the market for supply to households is contestable. However for the 
reasons set out in the previous section, the effectiveness of retail competition in Victoria 
is not clear. In this context, and having particular regard to the regressive and anti-
competitive impact of high fixed charges, we believe controls over fixed charges merit 
further investigation.  
 
3.5  Conclusions 
 
This report raises questions about the effectiveness of competition in the Victorian 
electricity retail market. We understand that the Victorian Government is also 
concerned about aspects of the market and that the ESC is investigating starting a 
review, building on its previous work. We have identified a few options to be pursued 
but suggest that understanding the market better is an important starting point.  It 
would be helpful if the issues raised in this paper were to be investigated in further 
detail by the ESC and the AER, in a process that actively engages consumers and the 
industry.  
